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S
ome time ago the following report caught the attention of the press 1: In the coastal region around Buenaventura, in the south of Colombia, foreign exporting and processing firms are engaged in highly lucrative business deals involving the immense wealth of timber of this region. Their methods are those of early capitalism: in many instances they conclude double-track contracts with the timber suppliers under which the sawmills are leased to the latter but at the same time recognized as economically autonomous. In this way they circumvent a number of inconvenient social obligations. The sawmills for their part get their tree trunks from wood-cutters to whom they pay a daily wage equivalent to DM 2.55 for 12 hours of very hard work.
Such practices may fit in perfectly with the hackneyed image of the multinational enterprises as neocolonialist exploiters but are certainly not typical of the role of foreign enterprises in the economic development of Colombia. This role must be viewed against the background of the industrialization process in Colombia which since the second half of the fifties has been going through the third phase of the CEPAL scheme 2. The characteristic feature of this phase is an expansion of the domestic market which has been speeded up by the establishment of an investment goods industry. Proceeding behind high tariff walls and aided by the -until 1967 almost complete -freedom of capital transfers, this expansion has been attracting foreign investors into the manufacturing industry in particular. US In the industrial sector the production of oil derivatives was most prominent: between 1967 and 1970 it attracted $ 7.9 mn (22.1 p.c.) of the total direct investment in industry of $ 35.8 mn during the same period. Chemicals (11.2 p.c.), pharmaceuticals (9.8 p.c.), wood processing (9.2 p.c.) and the electrical industry (7.5 p.c.) came next 5
The spread of the foreign capital over the various sectors reflects the Colombian policy of import substitution. The role to be assigned to foreign enterprises in this connection was indicated in the Decree No. 444. The foreign firms are to make a priority contribution to the easing of the balance of payments, on the one hand by saving foreign currencies (e.g. through closer integration with the domestic economy, smaller profit, royalty and interest transfers, etc.) and on the other by earning foreign currency through intensification of exports. The latter aim in particular has been gaining in importance because there is little scope for the strategy of import substitution in the relatively narrow Colombian market.
The policy of expansion and diversification of exports is also significant from the point of view of providing employment which is currently receiving top priority because of the rising unemployment in the country. The Colombian Government is therefore making increasing efforts to interest foreign enterprises in the establishment of labourintensive export industries so as to make better use in this way of the comparative advantages of the country -a relatively cheap and proficient labour force and a comparatively favourable geographical situation 6
These sectors apart however the foreign capital is still to be confined to "essential" industries which are short of capital, technologies and qualified management and kept from hampering the development of efficient domestic enterprises. The foreign investors are expected to strengthen the indigenous firms by linking up with domestic capital and promoting the establishment of a national industry supplying accessories.
Investment Policy Measures
The following are the principal measures set out in the Decree No. 444 as means of attaining these objectives:
[] All foreign investments require registration and authorization. Criteria for this are: the net effect on the foreign exchange, the consequences for employment and training, the technology contribution, the number and production capacity of existing suppliers, and the forward and backward linkages which may be expected to result from the investment.
[] All imports are subject to licence.
[] Contracts regulating the transfer of technologies must be officially approved.
The Colombian Congress has restricted the scope left to the competent Colombian authorities by the Decree No. 444 further by adopting the Decisions No. 24, 37 and 37A of the Commission of the Andes pact, of which Colombia is a member, which are a codification of the common policy of the Andean countries towards foreign capital. The following provisions are of special relevance in this respect:
[] All foreign enterprises which wish to avail themselves of the benefits of the trade liberalization insides the Andean area must be gradually, according to a precise(y fixed time schedule, converted into joint or domestic enterprises (with the participation of at least 51 or 80 p.c., respectively, of domestic capital).
[] The annual profit transfer must not exceed 14 p.c. of the invested capital.
[] The technology transfer is subject to strict control; licensing agreements must not contain restrictive clauses such as supply commitments or export restrictions.
These and other measures were taken when the foreign investments, which until 1967 had not been subjected to significant restrictions, aroused increasing criticism. The main complaints voiced about the foreign enterprises were that they were The available empirical data are insufficient for a detailed examination of these complaints. The following observations are therefore necessarily provisional and moreover confined to certain aspects.
Disagreement on the Balance of Payments Effects
The effects of the foreign capital on the balance of payments, for instance, cannot be determined with exactitude. If only a capital inflow-profit outflow comparison is undertaken, as is often done, the foreign investments will be seen to result in a loss of foreign currency. According to IMF data, the direct investments in Colombia during 1960-1974 totalled $ 446 mn whereas the transferred profits amounted to $ 711 mn, leaving a foreign currency loss of $ 265 mn 7. Measured in this way, the foreign currency effect varies greatly from sector to sector, as can be seen from the financial transactions of US enterprises in Colombia: while a foreign currency loss of $ 37 mn was thrown up by the oil sector, manufacturing industry yielded a surplus of $ 8 mn. The overall loss was $ 47 mn. [] Pharmaceuticals 14.6 p.c. [] The export trade is concentrated largely in the hands of relatively few and -in terms of employment provided -large firms.
[] The other countries of the Andes bloc (47 p.c.) and the USA are the principal foreign customers.
Data concerning the export intensity of the foreign enterprises are only available for the manufacturing subsidiaries of US firms in the years 1957 and 1966. While in 1957 the domestic market accounted for nearly all sales ($107 ran), exports in 1966 absorbed 10 p.c. of the total sales of $ 358 mn (including $ 24 mn of intra-group exports to combine companies outside Colombia) 10.
The relatively low export intensity -the US manufacturing subsidiaries in Canada and Western Europe achieved export quotas of 19.4 and 23.7 p.c., respectively, in 1965 -is in the first place due to the motivation of foreign investors in Colombia: their main interest is to supply the local market 11. From this follows that the investment projects are internationally not fully competitive: owing to the small size of the market the operating units are often too small to be profitable. Besides, high tariff protection and consequent absence of competitive pressure by similar imported products is not exactly conducive to raising productivity 12
It would however be wrong to deduce from the figures of foreign trade and financial transactions by the foreign enterprises that the foreign capital has a negative effect on the balance of payments. 
Fiscal Losses on Account of Foreign Enterprises
The second complaint -that the foreign enterprises have been paying too little in taxes -is based on the observed fact that the profits recorded by foreign subsidiaries are often astonishingly low. The annual profit rate of US firms in Colombia between 1960 und 1972 for instance averaged 5.9 p.c. -a distinctly lower rate than shown by US companies in industrial countries 13. The profits of the foreign companies are also' low in comparison with those of indigenous firms. Whereas the latter in 1967 and 1968 recorded profit rates of 9.2 and 9.3 p.c. in manufacturing industry and in the service sector, the corresponding figures for the foreign firms were 5.5 and 6.1 p.c., respectively ~4
That the recorded profits understate the actual profits seems to be borne out by the fact that 14 foreign automobile firms applied for production permits in 1969 although the existing companyChrysler Corp. -had for years been operating at a loss 15
Constantine Vaitsos has made an attempt to calculate a rate of effective profitability for foreign enterprises in Colombia. Starting from a definition of direct investment as a package of capital investment, technology transfer and trade ramification, he identified the effective profitability of an investment project as the sum total of recorded profits, intra-group payments of royalties and fees and the amount by which intra-group trade flows are over-or underinvoiced. In the case of 17 foreign enterprises in the pharmaceutical industry which represented 40 p.c. of the pharmaceutical market in Colombia in 1968 he found the recorded profits to be no more than 3.4 p. [] Finally, it is virtually impossible to make a correct estimate of the overpricing because it would have to be ascertained for this purpose whether and to what extent use is being made of intra-group imports as an instrument of internal cost allocation.
Besides, the pharmaceutical industry cannot be regarded as representative for industry generally: the considerable differences between national patent laws have a major bearing on its price policy. Nevertheless these objections cannot refute the argument that foreign enterprises caused a fiscal loss by keeping recorded profits too low.
The third complaint is that the foreign enterprises are not contributing significantly to the reduction of unemployment in the country. Data relating to manufacturing industry in 1960-1967 have been quoted in evidence. These show the sectors in which the foreign investments were concentrated to have a relatively high and indeed steadily rising capital intensity 17.
Furthermore, an unpublished investigation by the Departamento Nacional de Planeacibn showed that between 1957 and 1966 employment temporarily declined in 8 of altogether 18 industries employing domestic and foreign capital which were the subject of the investigation whereas the investment volume increased over the same period 18
Different findings however were reached in a study concerned with employment by foreign firms by the Banco de la RepOblica which covered 76 p.c. of the enterprises with foreign capital participation operating in Colombia 19. This study showed employment to have risen at an average growth rate of 6.2 p.c. annually in 1969-1971. In assessing the contribution to employment of foreign enterprises it must also be borne in mind that there is often a trade-off between labourintensive production methods on the one hand and productivity and international competitiveness on. the other.
One last complaint made about the foreign capital is that powerful multinational enterprises displace indigenous firms in the market. Moreover, foreign capital participation in local enterprises often results in considerable improvements in cost efficiency and productivity. It is the task of the political authorities to evaluate tradeoffs which occur in this connection -e.g. between the number of the suppliers, the relationship between foreign and domestic firms, productivity and employment -and to take decisions in the light of this evaluation. The necessary instruments have been put in their hands, especially bearing in mind that the harmonization of the investment policies of the Andes pact countries -towards which at least a beginning has been made -is strengthening their negotiating position vis-a-vis the foreign enterprises quite appreciably.
